In Poland the self-limiting revolution resulted in a sharp divison between the state and society and a well-defined political polarization. Almost from the beginning of the crisis the party-state elites confronted a mobilized society organized in complex territorial and professional networks. Faced with such massive pressure, the ruling elites were forced to surrender their control over vast areas of political and social life. This newly opened political space was immediately taken over by independent organizations. 1 While many demands voiced by the political opposition concerned the material conditions of life, working conditions, or social justice, the core of the division in society was the alienation of the Polish nation.
The central charge laid against the Party in 1980 was not that it had offended against human rights, not that it had ruined the economy, not that it had betrayed its trusteeship for the proletariat and not even that it had bound the state too closely to Soviet politics (. . .) It was that the Party had divided the nation and set Pole against Pole.
2
As a result of the pluralization of politics in the wake of 1989, a de-ideologization of this historical conflict could be expected. After 1989 the differentiation and pluralization of public and political life became associated with the destruction of central myths such as the myth of political unity, the myth of the national and moral unity of Polish society, and the myth of Solidarity. The rational and realistic acceptance of Western models seemed to leave no space for new utopias (Frybes and Michel, 1996:18-19) . Despite the unprecedented extent of systemic collapse in Poland, and the experimental character of both the round table and the economic shock-therapy, 'the catchphrase of the transition from communism was that "there was nothing new to invent" '.
3 Moreover, the pluralization of conflict-patterns seems to be the ordinary course of a transitional society. Social and political processes in transition are considered to be asymmetric and irreversible due to the high degree of indeterminacy of social and political actions and the inordinate degrees of freedom that guide collective and even individual action (O'Donnell et al., 1986:18-19) . While the anti-politics of civil society were based on a moral discourse of truth, the open society of post-1989 allowed for pluralism in autonomous social life (Ekiert, 1993; Gellner, 1994) . The development of interest politics rather than ethical anti-politics was supposed to replace identity-based or ideological cleavages of conflict. Accordingly, the round-table community inspired the reconciliatory stance of the first Solidarity government, whose premise was to draw a thick line under the past. Historical antagonisms seemed to wither away entirely as Poles opted for a change in politics by bringing former post-communist parties back to power in autumn 1993. The we-they dichotomy, so crucial in the 1970s and 1980s, ceased to be the key for understanding the situation in the 1990s (Wnuk-Lipiń ski, 1996:147; Frybes and Michel, 1996) . Strengthening socio-economic cleavages and political interests, the victory of post-communist parties was interpreted as a second thick line, drawn by society, 'that invalidates a significant part of the divisions that ruled the political scenario in previous elections'. 4 Examining political conflict in Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, Claus Offe argued that identity-based and ideological conflicts constituted the most significant obstacles to consolidation in Eastern Europe (Elster et al., 1998:247-70) . His analysis concluded with a distinction between 'easy' cases, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, and 'difficult' cases, such as Slovakia and Bulgaria. In the 'easy' cases, conflicts in politics and society shifted towards patterns of class conflict with a greater potential of reconcilability, which is expressed in a more advanced system of
